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Abstract
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altru-
istic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination of
1−βi times his direct cost and βi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters βi allows smooth inter-
polation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic
extensions of linear congestion games, fair cost-sharing games and valid utility games.
We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto,
we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essen-
tial properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds reveal that for con-
gestion games and cost-sharing games, the worst-case robust price of anarchy increases with increasing
altruism, while for valid utility games, it remains constant and is not affected by altruism. However, the
increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: for symmetric singleton linear congestion
games, we derive a bound on the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria that decreases as the level of
altruism increases. Since the bound is also strictly lower than the robust price of anarchy, it exhibits a
natural example in which Nash equilibria are more efficient than more permissive notions of equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Many large-scale decentralized systems, such as infrastructure investments or traffic on roads or computer
networks, bring together large numbers of individuals with different and oftentimes competing objectives.
When these individuals choose actions to benefit themselves, the result is frequently suboptimal for society
as a whole. This basic insight has led to a study of such systems from the viewpoint of game theory,
focusing on the inefficiency of stable outcomes. Traditionally, “stable outcomes” have been associated with
pure Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. The notions of price of anarchy [22] and price of stability
[2] provide natural measures of the system degradation, by capturing the degradation of the worst and best
Nash equilibria, respectively, compared to the socially optimal outcome.
However, the predictive power of such bounds has been questioned on (at least) two grounds:
1. The adoption of Nash equilibria as a prescriptive solution concept implicitly assumes that players
are able to reach such equilibria. In particular in light of several known hardness results for finding
Nash equilibria, this assumption is very suspect for computationally bounded players. In response,
recent work has begun analyzing the outcomes of natural response dynamics [7, 8, 34], as well as
more permissive solution concepts such as correlated or coarse correlated equilibria [3, 18, 35]. This
general direction of inquiry has become known as “robust price of anarchy”.
2. The assumption that players seek only to maximize their own utility is at odds with altruistic behavior
routinely observed in the real world. While modeling human incentives and behavior accurately is a
formidable task, several papers have proposed natural models of altruism [23, 24] and analyzed its
impact on the outcomes of games [11, 12, 13, 15, 20].
The goal of this paper is to begin a thorough investigation of the effects of relaxing both of the standard
assumptions simultaneously, i.e., considering the combination of weaker solution concepts and notions
of partially altruistic behavior by players. In Section 2, we formally define the altruistic extension with
parameters (βi) of an n-player game in the spirit of past work on altruism (see [23, p. 154] and [11, 12]):
informally, player i’s cost (or payoff) is a convex combination of (1−βi) times his direct cost (or payoff)
and βi times the social cost (or social welfare). By tuning the parameters βi, this model allows smooth
interpolation between pure selfishness (βi = 0) and pure altruism (βi = 1).
In order to analyze the degradation of system performance in light of partially altruistic behavior, we
extend the notion of robust price of anarchy [34] to altruistic extensions, and show that a suitably adapted
notion of smoothness [34] captures the properties of a system that determine its robust price of anarchy. We
use these insights to analyze three classes of games:
1. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze linear congestion games [33], in which players choose subsets of
resources whose costs increase (linearly) with the number of players using them.
2. In Section 5, we study fair cost-sharing games [2], in which players choose subsets of “infrastructure”
to build, and all players choosing the same item share the item’s cost evenly.
3. In Section 6, we apply our framework to valid utility games [36], in which players again choose “in-
frastructure” to build, deriving (submodular) utility of the chosen set. The total welfare is determined
by a submodular function of the union of all chosen sets.
We derive (mostly tight) bounds on the robust price of anarchy for these games under general altruism
distributions. In fact, the same bounds are tight when the altruism level is uniform, i.e., βi = β for all i.
Our bounds reveal a somewhat counterintuitive trend: for congestion games, the worst-case robust price of
anarchy actually increases (as (5+ 4β )/(2+β )) with increasing altruism β , and it does so unboundedly
(as n/(1− β )) for cost-sharing games. On the other hand, for valid utility games, the worst-case robust
price of anarchy remains at 2, unaffected by altruism.
The intuition behind the increase in the price of anarchy is the following: there are instances in which
all players get stuck choosing the wrong resources. A deviation by one player affects not only him, but
also others: for congestion games, the player may increase the cost on the resources he switches to, while
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for cost-sharing games, there will be fewer remaining players to share the cost of the player’s current item.
Thus, partially altruistic players have even stronger disincentive to deviate from the suboptimal strategy,
meaning that even worse system states are stable.
The above explanation intuitively corresponds to altruistic players “accepting” more states as “stable”.
This suggests that the best stable solution can also be chosen from a larger set, and the price of stability
should thus decrease. Our results lend partial support to this intuition: for congestion games, we derive an
upper bound on the price of stability which decreases as 2/(1+β ); similarly, for cost-sharing games, we
establish an upper bound which decreases as (1−β )Hn+β .
It should be noted that the increase in price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon. Indeed, for linear
symmetric singleton congestion games (in which all players have the same strategy set, consisting of all
sets of exactly one resource), we establish a bound of 4/(3+β ) for the price of anarchy with respect to
pure Nash equilibria. This bound is noteworthy not only because it shows improvements resulting from
the presence of altruism; it also establishes that pure Nash equilibria can result in strictly lower price of
anarchy than weaker solution concepts, as Lu¨cking et al. [25] gave an example of a class of linear symmetric
singleton congestion games whose price of anarchy under mixed Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily close to
2. In particular, this establishes a natural example of a class of games whose price of anarchy cannot be
established using the smoothness framework.
The paper is rounded out by a more in-depth analysis of the effect of combining players with different
altruism levels in singleton congestion games (Section 4), and a mathematical investigation of the set of
smoothness parameters that can occur in games (Section 7).
Related Work. Much of our analysis is based on extensions of the notion of smoothness as proposed
by Roughgarden [34] (see Section 2.2). The basic idea is to bound the sum of cost increases of individual
players switching strategies by a combination of the costs of two states. Because these types of bounds
capture local improvement dynamics, they bound the price of anarchy not only for Nash equilibria, but
also more general solution concepts, including coarse correlated equilibria. The smoothness notion was
recently refined in the local smoothness framework by Roughgarden and Schoppmann [35]. They require
the types of bounds described above only for nearby states, thus obtaining tighter bounds, albeit only
for more restrictive solution concepts and convex strategy sets. Using the local smoothness framework,
they obtained optimal upper bounds for atomic splittable congestion games. Nadav and Roughgarden [28]
showed that smoothness bounds apply all the way to solution concepts called “average coarse correlated
equilibrium”, but not beyond.
A comparison between the costs in worst-case outcomes under solution concepts of different generality
was recently undertaken by Bradonjic et al. [9] under the name “price of mediation”: specifically for the
case of symmetric singleton congestion games with convex latency functions, they showed that the ratio
between the most expensive correlated equilibrium and the most expensive Nash equilibrium can grow
exponentially in the number of players.
Hayrapetyan et al. [19] studied the impact of “collusion” in network congestion games, where players
form coalitions to minimize their collective cost. These coalitions are assumed to be formed exogeneously,
i.e., conceptually, each coalition is replaced by a “super-player” that acts on behalf of its members. The
authors show that collusion in network congestion games can lead to Nash equilibria that are inferior to
the ones of the collusion-free game (in terms of social cost). They also derive bounds on the the price of
anarchy caused by collusion. Note that the cooperation within each coalition can be interpreted as a kind of
“locally” altruistic behavior, i.e., each player only cares about the cost of the members of his coalition. In
a sense, the setting considered in [19] can therefore be regarded as being orthogonal to the viewpoint that
we adopt in this paper: in their setting, players are assumed to be entirely altruistic but locally attached to
their coalitions. In contrast, in our setting, players may have different levels of altruism but locality does
not play a role.
Several recent studies investigate “irrational” player behavior in games; examples include studies on
malicious (or spiteful) behavior [5, 10, 13, 21] and unpredictable (or Byzantine) behavior [8, 27, 31]. The
work that is most related to our work in this context is the one by Blum et al. [8]. The authors consider
repeated games in which every player is assumed to minimize his own regret. They derive bounds on the
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inefficiency, called total price of anarchy, of the resulting outcomes for certain classes of games, including
congestion games and valid utility games. The exhibited bounds exactly match the respective price of
anarchy and even continue to hold if only some of the players minimize their regret while the others are
Byzantine. The latter result is surprising: in the context of valid utility games because it means that the
price of total anarchy remains at 2, even if additional players are added to the game that behave arbitrarily.
Our findings allow us to draw an even more dramatic conclusion. Our bounds on the robust price of
anarchy also extend to the total price of anarchy of the respective repeated games (see Section 2.3). As a
consequence, our result for valid utility games implies that the price of total anarchy would remain at 2, even
if the “Byzantine” players were to act altruistically. That is, while the result in [8] suggests that arbitrary
behavior does not harm the inefficiency of the final outcome, our result shows that altruistic behavior does
not help.
If players’ altruism levels are not uniform, then even the existence of pure Nash equilibria is not ob-
vious. Hoefer and Skopalik established it for several subclasses of atomic congestion games [20]; for the
generalization of arbitrary player-specific cost functions, Milchtaich [26] showed existence for singleton
congestion games, and Ackermann et al. [1] for matroid congestion games, in which the strategy space of
each player is the basis of a matroid on the set of resources.
Models of Altruism. Models of altruism either identical or very similar to the one in this paper have
been studied in several papers. Perhaps the first published suggestion of a similar model is due to Ledyard
[23], but since then, different variations of it have been studied more extensively, e.g., [11, 12, 13, 15]. The
main difference is that in some of these models, linear combinations (rather than convex combinations) are
considered, e.g., with the selfish term having a factor of 1. For most of these variations, a straightforward
scaling of the coefficients shows equivalence with the model we consider here. The altruism model can
be naturally extended to include βi < 0, modeling spiteful behavior (see, e.g., [13]). While the modeling
extension is natural, several results in this and other papers do not continue to hold directly for negative βi.
Our model is strictly more general than some of the previous work in that the social cost function need not
be the sum of all players’ costs, but rather only needs to be bounded by the sum.
Besides models based on linear combinations of individual players’ costs (as well as social welfare),
several other approaches have been studied. Generally, altruism or other “other-regarding” social behavior
has received some attention in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., [17]). Alternative models of altru-
ism and spite have been proposed by Levine [24], Rabin [30] and Geneakoplos et al. [16]. These models
are designed more with the goal of modeling the psychological processes underlying spite or altruism (and
reciprocity): they involve players forming beliefs about other players. As a result, they are well-suited for
experimental work, but perhaps not as directly suited for the type of analysis in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (N,{Σi}i∈N ,{Ci}i∈N) be a finite strategic game, where N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players, Σi
the strategy space of player i, and Ci : Σ→ R the cost function of player i, mapping every joint strategy
s ∈ Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn to the player’s direct cost. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that every player i ∈ N
wants to minimize his individual cost function Ci. We also call such games cost-minimization games. A
social cost function C : Σ→ R maps strategies to social costs. We require that C be sum-bounded, i.e.,
C(s)≤ ∑ni=1 Ci(s) for all s ∈ Σ.
In this paper, we study the altruistic extension of strategic games equipped with sum-bounded social
cost functions, defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let G = (N,{Σi}i∈N ,{Ci}i∈N) be a cost-minimization game with a sum-bounded social cost
function C. Let β be a vector in [0,1]n. The β -altruistic extension of G (or simply β -altruistic game) is
defined as the strategic game Gβ = (N,{Σi}i∈N ,{Cβi }i∈N), where for every i ∈ N and s ∈ Σ,
Cβi (s) = (1−βi)Ci(s)+βiC(s).
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Thus, the perceived cost that a player experiences is a convex combination of his direct (selfish) cost
and the social cost; we call such a player βi-altruistic.1 When βi = 0, player i is entirely selfish; thus,
β = 0 recovers the original game. Similarly, a player with βi = 1 is entirely altruistic. Given an altruism
vector β ∈ [0,1]n, we let βˆ = maxi∈N βi and βˇ = mini∈N βi denote the maximum and minimum altruism
level of a player, respectively. An important special case occurs when all players have the same altruism
level βi = β . We call such games uniformly β -altruistic games, with β being a scalar (instead of a vector)
that characterizes the common altruism level.
The altruistic extension of a payoff-maximization game, in which players seek to maximize their payoff
functions {Πi}i∈N , with a social welfare function Π is defined analogously to Definition 1.
2.1 Equilibrium Concepts
We study the inefficiency of equilibria in altruistic extensions of various games. The most general equilib-
rium concept that we will deal with is the following one.
Definition 2. A coarse equilibrium (or coarse correlated equilibrium) of a game G is a probability distri-
bution σ over Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn with the following property: if s is a random variable with distribution σ ,
then for each player i, and all s∗i ∈ Σi: Es∼σ [Ci(s)]≤ Es−i∼σ−i [Ci(s∗i ,s−i)], where σ−i is the projection of σ
on Σ−i = Σ1×·· ·×Σi−1×Σi+1×·· ·×Σn.
The set of all coarse equilibria is also known as the Hannan Set (see, e.g., [37]). It includes several
other solution concepts, such as correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria. (A
brief review of the definitions of these notions is given in Appendix A.)
The price of anarchy (PoA) [22] and price of stability (PoS) [2] are natural ways of quantifying the
inefficiency of equilibria for classes of games:
Definition 3. Let S⊆Σ be a set of strategy profiles for a cost-minimization game G with social cost function
C, and let s∗ be a strategy profile that minimizes C. We define
PoA(S,G) = sup
s∈S
C(s)
C(s∗)
and PoS(S,G) = inf
s∈S
C(s)
C(s∗)
.
The coarse (or correlated, mixed, pure) price of anarchy (or price of stability) of a class of games G is the
supremum over all games in G and all strategy profiles in the respective set of equilibrium outcomes.
Notice that the PoA and PoS are defined with respect to the original social cost function C, not ac-
counting for the altruistic components. This reflects our desire to understand the overall performance of the
system (or strategic game), which is not affected by different perceptions of costs by individuals. Note, how-
ever, that if all players have a uniform altruism level βi = β ∈ [0,1] and the social cost function C is equal
to the sum of all players’ individual costs, then for every strategy profile s ∈ Σ, Cβ (s) = (1−β +βn)C(s),
where Cβ (s) =∑i∈N C
β
i (s) denotes the sum of all players’ perceived costs. In particular, bounding the PoA
(or PoS) with respect to C is equivalent to bounding the PoA (or PoS) with respect to total perceived cost
Cβ in this case.
We extend Definition 3 in the obvious way to payoff-maximization games G with social welfare function
Π by considering the ratio Π(s∗)/Π(s), where s∗ refers to a strategy profile maximizing Π.
2.2 Smoothness
Many proofs bounding the price of anarchy for specific games (e.g., [33, 36]) use the fact that deviating from
an equilibrium to the strategy at optimum is not beneficial for any player. The addition of these inequalities,
1We note that the altruistic part of an individual’s perceived cost does not recursively take other players’ perceived cost into
account. Such recursive definitions of altruistic utility have been studied, e.g., by Bergstrom [6], and can be reduced to our definition
under suitable technical conditions.
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combined with suitable properties of the social cost function, then gives a bound on the equilibrium’s cost.
Roughgarden [34] recently captured the essence of this type of argument with his definition of (λ ,µ)-
smoothness of a game, thus providing a generic template for proving bounds on the price of anarchy.
Indeed, because such arguments only reason about local moves by players, they immediately imply bounds
not only for Nash equilibria, but all classes of equilibria defined in Section 2.1, as well as the outcomes
of no-regret sequences of play [8, 7]. Recent work has explored both the limits of this concept [28] and
a refinement requiring smoothness only in local neighborhoods [35]. The latter permits more fine-grained
analysis of games, but applies only to correlated equilibria and their subclasses.
We extend the concept of (λ ,µ)-smoothness to altruistic extensions of strategic games. This allows us
to quantify the price of anarchy of these games with respect to the very broad class of coarse correlated
equilibria. For notational convenience, we define C−i(s) =C(s)−Ci(s)≤ ∑ j 6=i C j(s).
Definition 4. Let Gβ be a β -altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded social cost function C. Gβ is
(λ ,µ,β )-smooth iff for any two strategy profiles s,s∗ ∈ Σ,
n
∑
i=1
Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C−i(s
∗
i ,s−i)−C−i(s))≤ λC(s∗)+µC(s). (1)
For β = 0, this definition coincides with Roughgarden’s notion of (λ ,µ)-smoothness. To gain some
intuition, consider two strategy profiles s,s∗ ∈ Σ, and a player i ∈ N who switches from his strategy si under
s to s∗i , while the strategies of the other players remain fixed at s−i. The contribution of player i to the left-
hand side of (1) then accounts for the individual cost that player i perceives after the switch plus βi times
the difference in social cost caused by this switch. The sum of these contributions needs to be bounded by
λC(s∗)+µC(s).
2.3 Preliminary Results
We first show that many of the results in [34] following from (λ ,µ)-smoothness carry over to our altruistic
setting using the extended (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness notion (Definition 4). Even though some care has to be
taken in extending these results, most of the proofs of the propositions in this section follow along similar
lines as their analogues in [34]; we therefore defer these proofs to Appendix B.
Proposition 1. Let Gβ be a β -altruistic game. If Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth with µ < 1, then the coarse price
of anarchy of Gβ is at most λ1−µ .
As coarse equilibria include correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria, the
above theorem also holds for these solution concepts.
As we show later, for many important classes of games, the bounds obtained by (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness
arguments are actually tight, even for pure Nash equilibria. Therefore, as in [34], we define the robust price
of anarchy as the best possible bound on the coarse price of anarchy obtainable by a (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness
argument.
Definition 5. The robust price of anarchy of a β -altruistic game Gβ is defined as
RPoAG(β ) = inf
{
λ
1−µ : G
β is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth, µ < 1
}
.
For a class G of games, we define RPoAG (β ) = sup{RPoAG(β ) : G ∈ G }. We omit the subscript when the
game (or class of games) is clear from the context.
The smoothness condition also proves useful in the context of no-regret sequences and the price of total
anarchy, introduced by Blum et al. [8].
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Proposition 2. Let s∗ be a strategy profile minimizing the social cost function C of a β -altruistic game Gβ ,
and s1, . . . ,sT a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player i ∈ N experiences vanishing average
external regret, i.e.,
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
t)≤
(
min
s′i∈Σi
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
′
i,s
t
−i)
)
+o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T strategy profiles then satisfies 1T ∑
T
t=1 C(s
t) ≤ RPoA(β ) ·C(s∗) as
T → ∞.
Roughgarden [34, Proposition 2.6] shows that for games that have an underestimating exact potential
function, best response dynamics2 converge rapidly to a strategy profile of social cost close to the robust
price of anarchy times the optimum social cost of the game; see [34] for a precise statement of this result
and the accompanying definitions. Proposition 2.6 in [34] and its proof straightforwardly carry over to
(λ ,µ,β )-smooth games that have such an underestimating exact potential function.
The results in this section continue to hold for altruistic extensions of payoff-maximization games if
we adapt Definition 4 as follows. Let Gβ be a β -altruistic extension of a payoff-maximization game with
social welfare function Π. Define Π−i(s) =Π(s)−Πi(s). Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth iff for every two strategy
profiles s,s∗ ∈ Σ,
n
∑
i=1
(Πi(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(Π−i(s
∗
i ,s−i)−Π−i(s)))≥ λΠ(s∗)−µΠ(s). (2)
Given this smoothness definition, all the results above hold when we replace λ1−µ by
1+µ
λ and µ < 1 by
µ >−1 in Definition 5.
3 Congestion Games
In an atomic congestion game G = (N,E,{de}e∈E ,{Σi}i∈N), we are given a set of players N = {1, . . . ,n}, a
set of facilities E with delay functions de :N→R for every facility e∈E, and a strategy set Σi⊆ 2E for every
player i ∈ N. For a joint strategy s ∈ Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn, define xe(s) = |{i : e ∈ si}| as the number of players
using facility e ∈ E. The social objective function is C(s) =∑ni=1 Ci(s), where Ci(s) =∑e∈si de(xe(s)) is the
cost of player i ∈ N. In a linear congestion game, the delay function of every facility e ∈ E is of the form
de(x) = aex+be, where ae,be ∈ Q+ are non-negative rational numbers. By using standard transformation
arguments, we can assume without loss of generality that the delay functions are of the form de(x) = x; the
details are in Appendix C.2.
Linear congestion games have the advantage that pure Nash equilibria of their altruistic extensions
always exist [20], which may not be the case for arbitrary congestion games. The price of anarchy of linear
congestion games in the purely selfish setting (β = 0) is known to be 52 [4, 14]. We extend this result to
altruistic congestion games and the robust price of anarchy.
Theorem 1. The robust price of anarchy of β -altruistic linear congestion games is at most 5+2βˆ+2βˇ
2−βˆ+2βˇ .
If all players have uniform altruism level β ∈ [0,1], the above bound reduces to 5+4β2+β . This is tight, as
shown in Example 1 below.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need the following technical lemma, whose proof is in Appendix C.2.
Lemma 1. For every two integers x,y ∈ N0 and βˆ , βˇ ∈ [0,1] with βˆ ≥ βˇ ,
((1+ βˆ )x+1)y+ βˇ (1− x)x≤ 5+2βˆ+2βˇ3 y2+ 1+βˆ−2βˇ3 x2.
2Best response dynamics are a natural way of searching for a pure Nash equilibrium: if the current strategy profile is not a Nash
equilibrium, then pick a player who can improve his cost and change his strategy to one that minimizes his cost.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We show that the β -altruistic extension Gβ of a linear congestion game is ( 13 (5+2βˆ+
2βˇ ), 13 (1+ βˆ −2βˇ ),β )-smooth.
Let s and s∗ be two strategy profiles, and write xe = xe(s),x∗e = xe(s∗). The left-hand side of the smooth-
ness condition (1) is equivalent to
n
∑
i=1
((1−βi)Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C(s∗i ,s−i)−C(s))+βiCi(s))
=
n
∑
i=1
(1−βi)( ∑
e∈s∗i \si
(xe+1)+ ∑
e∈si∩s∗i
xe
)
+βi
 ∑
e∈s∗i \si
(2xe+1)+ ∑
e∈si\s∗i
(1−2xe)
+βiCi(s)

≤
n
∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗i
((1+βi)xe+1)+βi ∑
e∈si
(1− xe)
≤ ∑
e∈E
(
((1+ βˆ )xe+1)x∗e + βˇ (1− xe)xe
)
.
In the above derivation, the first inequality follows from the fact that (1−βi)xe≤ (1+βi)xe+1+βi(1−2xe)
for every e ∈ si∩ s∗i . The second inequality holds because for every i ∈ N and e ∈ si, 1− xe ≤ 0 and by the
definition of βˆ and βˇ . The bound on the robust price of anarchy now follows from Lemma 1.
The following example shows that the upper bound on the robust price of anarchy given above is tight
for uniformly β -altruistic games, even for pure Nash equilibria.
Example 1. Consider a game with three β -altruistic players and six resources E = E1 ∪ E2, E1 =
{h0,h1,h2}, E2 = {g0,g1,g2}. The delay functions are given by de(x) = (1+β )x for e ∈ E1, and de(x) = x
for e ∈ E2. Each player i has two pure strategies: {hi−1,gi−1} and {h(i−2) (mod 3),hi (mod 3),gi (mod 3)}. The
strategy profile in which every player selects his first strategy is a social optimum of cost (1+β ) ·3+3 =
(2+β ) ·3. Consider the strategy profile s in which every player chooses his second strategy. We argue that s
is a Nash equilibrium: Each player’s perceived individual cost is c1 = (1−β )(4(1+β )+1)+β (5+4β ) ·3,
whereas if a player unilaterally deviates to his first strategy, the new social cost would become (5+ 4β ) ·
3+ 1−β . Thus, the player’s new perceived individual cost is c2 = (1−β )(3(1+β )+ 2)+β ((5+ 4β ) ·
3+1−β ). Because c1 = c2, s is a Nash equilibrium, of cost 4(1+β ) ·3+3 = (5+4β ) ·3. We conclude
that PoA≥ 5+4β2+β for β ∈ [0,1].
We turn to the pure price of stability of β -altruistic congestion games. Clearly, an upper bound on
the pure price of stability extends to the mixed, correlated and coarse price of stability. The proof of the
following proposition exploits a standard technique to bound the pure PoS of exact potential games (see,
e.g., [29]) and is deferred to Appendix C.2.
Proposition 3. The pure price of stability of uniformly β -altruistic linear congestion games is at most 21+β .
4 Singleton Congestion Games
While the price of anarchy for general congestion games increases with β , the situation is markedly dif-
ferent for the PoA of symmetric singleton congestion games. In a symmetric singleton congestion game
G= (N,E,{Σi}i∈N ,{de}e∈E), every player chooses one facility (also called edge) from E = {1, . . . ,m}, and
all strategy sets are identical, i.e., Σi = E for every i. We assume that the delay functions are of the form
de(x) = aex+be. Note that the transformation of Appendix C.2 does not work in this setting.
In this section, we analyze perhaps the two most fundamental cases with respect to altruistic singleton
congestion games: the uniform case, and the case when all altruism levels are in {0,1}, i.e., each player
is either completely altruistic or completely selfish. For both settings, we establish bounds on the pure
PoA which improve with the total altruism level in the system, i.e., decrease in β or the fraction of selfish
players. This stands in marked contrast to the bounds in the previous section.
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Theorem 2. The pure price of anarchy of uniformly β -altruistic extensions of symmetric singleton linear
congestion games is 43+β .
While in the previous section, we were able to derive tight bounds via smoothness arguments, this is
not possible for altruistic extensions of symmetric singleton congestion games. For example, by the above
theorem, the price of anarchy in the purely selfish setting is 4/3, whereas Lu¨cking et al. [25, Theorem 5.4]
showed that the mixed price of anarchy for symmetric singleton congestion games with delay functions
de(x) = x is 1+min{m−1n , n−1m }. That is, for n=m, the mixed price of anarchy approaches 2 as n increases.
The bound given in Theorem 2 can therefore not be derived via a smoothness argument.
Theorem 2 implies that the pure PoA is 1 if all players are completely altruistic. We remark that this
continues to hold true for the more general class of semi-convex3 delay functions (see Corollary 1 below).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium of Gβ and s∗ an optimal strategy profile. We write
xe = xe(s) and x∗e = xe(s∗). For every edge e ∈ E, define ∆e = xe− x∗e . Let E+ and E− be the set of edges
with ∆e > 0 and ∆e < 0, respectively. Define ∆= ∑e∈E+ ∆e > 0. Because s and s∗ assign the same number
of players to edges, ∆=∑e∈E+ ∆e =−∑e∈E− ∆e. If ∆= 0, then the PoA is 1. Hence, we assume that ∆> 0,
in which case both E+ and E− are non-empty.
By definition, xe > x∗e ≥ 0 for every edge e ∈ E+. Because s is a Nash equilibrium of Gβ , we have for
every edge e ∈ E+ and e¯ ∈ E that
(1−β )(aexe+be)+β ((aex2e +bexe)+(ae¯x2e¯ +be¯xe¯))
≤ (1−β )(ae¯(xe¯+1)+be¯)+β
(
(ae(xe−1)2+be(xe−1))+(ae¯(xe¯+1)2+be¯(xe¯+1))
)
,
which is equivalent to
(1+β )aexe+be−βae ≤ (1+β )ae¯xe¯+be¯+ae¯. (3)
We can use this relation in order to show that
∑
e∈E+
∆e((1+β )aex∗e +be+ae∆e)+ ∑
e∈E−
∆e((1+β )aex∗e +be+βae∆e)
≤ ∆
(
max
e∈E+
{(1+β )aexe+be−βae}− min
e∈E−
{(1+β )aexe+be+ae}
)
≤ 0. (4)
The first inequality follows from the definition of ∆e and because ∆e ≥ 1 for every e ∈ E+ and ∆e ≤−1 for
every e ∈ E−; the last inequality follows from (3). Thus,
C(s) = ∑
e∈E
(x∗e +∆e)(ae(x
∗
e +∆e)+be)
= ∑
e∈E
(aex∗2e +bex
∗
e)+ ∑
e∈E+
∆e(2aex∗e +be+ae∆e)+ ∑
e∈E−
∆e(2aex∗e +be+ae∆e)
≤ C(s∗)+(1−β )
(
∑
e∈E+
∆eaex∗e + ∑
e∈E−
∆eaexe
)
≤ C(s∗)+ 14 (1−β ) ∑
e∈E+
ae(x∗e +∆e)
2
≤ C(s∗)+ 14 (1−β )C(s).
The first inequality holds because of (4). The second inequality uses that xy ≤ 14 (x+ y)2 for arbitrary real
numbers x,y and that ∆eaexe ≤ 0 for every e ∈ E−. Hence, the pure price of anarchy is at most 4/(3+β ).
To see that this bound is tight, consider the β -altruistic extension of a congestion game with two players
and two edges E = {1,2} with delay functions d1(x) = x and d2(x) = 2+β . If the players use different
edges, we obtain an optimal strategy profile of cost 3+β . If both players use edge 1, we obtain a Nash
equilibrium of cost 4.
3The delay functions (de)e∈E are semi-convex if for every edge e ∈ E, x ·de(x) is convex.
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Next, we focus on a second very natural special case: when all altruism levels are either 0 or 1. This
kind of scenario, in which each player is either completely selfish or completely altruistic, has some natural
relationship with Stackelberg routing games [32], and constitutes another class of examples where system
performance improves with the total amount of altruism present.
Theorem 3. The pure price of anarchy of β -altruistic extensions of symmetric singleton linear congestion
games with β ∈ {0,1}n is at most 1+ n02n+n0 , where n0 is the number of selfish players.
Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium of Gβ and s∗ an optimal strategy profile. Again, let xe = xe(s) and
x∗e = xe(s∗). Based on the strategy profile s, we partition the edges in E into sets E0,E1.
E1 = {e ∈ E : ∃i ∈ N with βi = 1 and si = {e}},
is the set of edges having at least one altruistic player, while E0 = E \E1 is the set of edges that are used
exclusively by selfish players or not used at all. Let N1 and N0 refer to the respective player sets that are
assigned to E1 and E0. N1 may contain both altruistic and selfish players, while N0 consists of selfish players
only. Let k1 = ∑e∈E1 xe and k0 = n− k1 denote the number of players in N1 and N0, respectively.
The high-level approach of our proof is as follows: We split the total cost C(s) of the pure Nash
equilibrium into C(s) = γC(s) + (1− γ)C(s) for some γ ∈ [0,1] such that γC(s) = ∑e∈E0 xede(xe) and
(1− γ)C(s) = ∑e∈E1 xede(xe). We bound these two contributions separately to show that
3
4γC(s)+(1− γ)C(s)≤C(s∗). (5)
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at most ( 34γ+(1−γ))−1 = 44−γ . The bound of 1+ n02n+n0 then follows
by deriving an upper bound on γ in Lemma 4.
Lemma 2. Assume that the delay functions (de)e∈E are semi-convex. Then there is an optimal strategy
profile s∗ such that xe ≤ x∗e for every edge e ∈ E1.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix D. Note that Lemma 2 implies that at least for singleton
congestion games, entirely altruistic players will ensure that Nash equilibria are optimal.
Corollary 1. The pure price of anarchy of 1-altruistic extensions of symmetric singleton congestion games
with semi-convex delay functions is 1.
Henceforth, we assume that s∗ is an optimal strategy profile that satisfies the statement of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Define y∗ as y∗e = x∗e − xe ≥ 0 for every e ∈ E1, and y∗e = x∗e for all edges e ∈ E0. Then,
∑e∈E0 xede(xe)≤ 43 ∑e∈E y∗ede(x∗e).
Proof. Consider the game G¯ induced by Gβ if all k1 players in N1 are fixed on the edges in E1 according
to s. Note that all remaining k0 = n− k1 players in N0 are selfish. That is, G¯ is a symmetric singleton
congestion game with player set N0, edge set E and delay functions (d¯e)e∈E , where d¯e(z) = de(xe + z) if
e ∈ E1 and d¯e(z) = de(z) for e ∈ E0. Let s¯ be the restriction of s to the players in N0, and define x¯ as x¯e = 0
for e ∈ E1 and x¯e = xe for e ∈ E0. It is not hard to verify that s¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game G¯.
Let s¯∗ be a socially optimum profile for G¯, and for each edge e, let x¯∗e be the total number of players on e
under S¯∗. Then,
∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) = ∑
e∈E
x¯ed¯e(x¯e)≤ 43 ∑
e∈E
x¯∗e d¯e(x¯
∗
e)≤ 43 ∑
e∈E
y∗e d¯e(y
∗
e) =
4
3 ∑
e∈E
y∗ede(x
∗
e),
where the first inequality follows from Theorem 2 and the second inequality follows from the optimality of
x¯∗.
Lemma 4. It holds that γ ≤ 2n0n+n0 .
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The proof is given in Appendix 4.
Proof of Theorem 3. Using the above lemmas, we can show that the relation in (5) holds:
3
4γC(s)+(1− γ)C(s) = 34 ∑
e∈E0
xede(xe)+ ∑
e∈E1
xede(xe)≤ ∑
e∈E
x∗ede(x
∗
e)+ ∑
e∈E1
(xede(xe)− xede(x∗e))≤C(s∗),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the last inequality follows from Lemma 2 and because
delay functions are monotone increasing. We conclude that the pure price of anarchy is at most ( 34γ+(1−
γ))−1 = 44−γ . The stated bound now follows from Lemma 4.
5 Fair Cost-sharing Games
In a fair cost-sharing game, players choose facilities, and the cost of each selected facility is shared
evenly among the players that have selected it. Formally, a cost-sharing game is a congestion game
G = (N,E,{de}e∈E ,{Σi}i∈N) with decreasing delay functions of the form de(x) = ce/x for every e ∈ E,
where ce ∈ Q+ is the non-negative cost of facility e. Let E(s) = ⋃i∈N si be the union of all facilities used
under s. The social objective function is C(s) = ∑ni=1 Ci(s) = ∑e∈E(s) ce.
It is well-known that the pure price of anarchy of fair cost-sharing games is n [29]. We show that it
can get significantly worse in the presence of altruistic players: the following theorem gives a much worse
upper bound, which we subsequently show to be tight.
Theorem 4. The robust price of anarchy of β -altruistic cost-sharing games is at most n
1−βˆ (with n/0=∞).
Proof. The claim is true for βˆ = 1 because RPoA(β ) ≤ ∞ holds trivially. We show that Gβ is (n, βˆ ,β )-
smooth for βˆ ∈ [0,1). Let s and s∗ be two strategy profiles. Fix an arbitrary player i ∈ N. We have
C(s∗i ,s−i)−C(s) = ∑
e∈E(s∗i ,s−i)
ce− ∑
e∈E(s)
ce ≤ ∑
e∈s∗i \E(s)
ce.
We use this inequality obtain the following bound:
(1−βi)Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C(s∗i ,s−i)−C(s)) ≤ (1−βi) ∑
e∈s∗i
ce
xe(s∗i ,s−i)
+βi ∑
e∈s∗i \E(s)
ce
xe(s∗i ,s−i)
≤ ∑
e∈s∗i
ce
xe(s∗i ,s−i)
≤ ∑
e∈s∗i
n · ce
xe(s∗)
.
The first inequality holds because xe(s∗i ,s−i) = 1 for every e∈ s∗i \E(s), and the last inequality follows from
xe(s∗i ,s−i)≥ xe(s∗)/n for every e ∈ s∗i . Using the above,
n
∑
i=1
((1−βi)Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C(s∗i ,s−i)−C(s))+βiCi(s))≤
n
∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗i
n · ce
xe(s∗)
+ βˆC(s) = nC(s∗)+ βˆC(s).
We conclude that the robust price of anarchy is at most n
1−βˆ . Example 2 shows that this bound is tight, even
for pure Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Consider the cost-sharing game in which n players can choose between two different facilities
e1 and e2 of cost 1 and n/(1−β ), respectively. Let s∗ = (e1, . . . ,e1) and s= (e2, . . . ,e2) refer to the strategy
profiles in which every player chooses e1 and e2, respectively. Then C(s∗) = 1 and C(s) = n/(1−β ). Note
that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of the β -altruistic extension of this game because for every player i we
have
(1−β )Ci(s)+βC(s) = 1+β n1−β =C
β
i ({e1},s−i).
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at least n/(1−β ).
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As with congestion games, the PoS does improve with increased altruism. The proof of the following
proposition is given in Appendix E.
Proposition 4. The pure price of stability of uniformly β -altruistic cost-sharing games is at most (1−
β )Hn+β .
6 Valid Utility Games
A valid utility game [36] is a payoff maximization game given by G = (N,E,{Σi}i∈N ,{Πi}i∈N ,V ), where
E is a ground set, the strategy sets Σi are subsets of 2E , Πi is the payoff function of player i, and V is
a submodular4 and non-negative function on E. Every player strives to maximize his individual payoff
function Πi.
For a joint strategy s ∈ Σ, let U(s) ⊆ E be the union of all players’ strategies under s. The social
welfare function Π : Σ→ R to be maximized is Π(s) = V (U(s)), and thus depends only on the union of
the players’ chosen strategies, evaluated by V . The individual payoff functions of all players i ∈ N are
assumed to satisfy5 Πi(s)≥Π(s)−Π( /0,s−i) for every strategy profile s∈ Σ. Intuitively, this means that the
individual payoff of a player is at least his contribution to the social welfare. Moreover, it is assumed that
Π(s)≥∑ni=1Πi(s) for every s∈ Σ. See [36] for a detailed description and justification of these assumptions.
Examples of games falling into this framework include natural game-theoretic variants of the facility
location, k-median and network routing problems [36]. Vetta [36] proved a bound of 2 on the pure price of
anarchy for valid utility games with non-decreasing V , and Roughgarden showed in [34] how this bound is
achieved via a (λ ,µ)-smoothness argument. We extend this result to altruistic extensions of these games.
Theorem 5. The robust price of anarchy of β -altruistic valid utility games is 2.
Proof. We show that the β -altruistic extension Gβ of a valid utility game is (1,1,β )-smooth.
Fix two strategy profiles s,s∗ ∈ Σ and consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N. By assumption, Πi(s) ≥
Π(s)−Π( /0,s−i). For each player i ∈ N, we therefore have
Π(s∗i ,s−i)−Π(s)+Πi(s) = (Π(s∗i ,s−i)−Π( /0,s−i))− (Π(s)−Π( /0,s−i))+Πi(s)
≥ Π(s∗i ,s−i)−Π( /0,s−i). (6)
Now let Ui =
⋃n
j=1 s j ∪
⋃i
j=1 s
∗
j . Summing over all i ∈ N,
n
∑
i=1
((1−βi)Πi(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(Π(s∗i ,s−i)−Π(s)+Πi(s))) ≥
n
∑
i=1
(Π(s∗i ,s−i)−Π( /0,s−i))
=
n
∑
i=1
(V (U(s∗i ,s−i))−V (U( /0,s−i))) ≥
n
∑
i=1
(V (Ui)−V (Ui−1)) ≥ Π(s∗)−Π(s).
Here, the first inequality follows from (6) and because Πi(s) ≥ Π(s)−Π( /0,s−i) for every i, the second
inequality holds because V is submodular, and the final inequality follows from V being non-decreasing.
We conclude that Gβ is (1,1,β )-smooth, which proves an upper bound of 2 on the robust price of anarchy.
This bound is tight, as shown by Example 3.
Example 3. Consider a valid utility game G with a set N = {1,2} of two players, a ground set E = {1,2} of
two elements and strategy sets Σ1 = {{1},{2}}, Σ2 = { /0,{1}}. Define V (S) = |S| for every subset S ⊆ E.
Note that V is non-negative, non-decreasing and submodular.
For a given strategy profile s ∈ Σ, the individual profits Π1(s) and Π2(s) of player 1 and player 2,
respectively, are defined as follows: Π1(s) = 1 for all strategy profiles s. Π2(s) = 1 if s = ({2},{1}) and
Π2(s) = 0 otherwise. It is not hard to verify that for every player i and every strategy profile s ∈ Σ we have
4For a finite set E, a function f : 2E →R is called submodular iff f (A∪{x})− f (A)≥ f (B∪{x})− f (B) for any A⊆ B⊆ E,x∈ E.
5We abuse notation and write Π( /0,s−i) to denote V (U(s)\si).
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Πi(s)≥Π(s)−Π( /0,s−i). Moreover, Π(s)≥Π1(s)+Π2(s) for every s ∈ Σ. We conclude that G is a valid
utility game.
Let β ∈ [0,1]2, and consider the β -altruistic extension Gβ of G. We claim that s = ({1}, /0) is a pure
Nash equilibrium of Gβ : the profit of player 1 under s is (1− β1)+ β1 = 1. His profit remains 1 if he
switches to strategy {2}. The profit of player 2 under s is β2. If he switches to strategy {1}, then his profit
is β2 as well. Thus, s is a pure Nash equilibrium. Since Π(s) = 1 and Π(({2},{1})) = 2, the pure price of
anarchy of G is 2.
7 General Properties of Smoothness
For the game classes that we analyzed (with the exception of symmetric singleton congestion games), we
used (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness as our main tool to derive bounds on the price of anarchy. In this section, we
provide some general results about (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness. The proofs can be found in Appendix F.
Proposition 5. Suppose that G is a class of cost-minimization games equipped with sum-bounded social
cost functions. The set SG = {(λ ,µ,β ) : ∀G ∈ G , Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth} is convex.
A natural question to ask is whether the robust price of anarchy is also a convex function of β . This
turns out not to be the case. For instance, the robust price of anarchy for uniformly β -altruistic congestion
games is 5+4β2+β (see Section 3), which is a non-convex function. However, we can prove a somewhat
weaker statement: For a subset S ⊆ Rn, we call a function f : S→ R quasi-convex iff f (γx+(1− γ)y) ≤
max{ f (x), f (y)} for all γ ∈ [0,1].
Theorem 6. Let G be a class of games equipped with sum-bounded social cost functions. Then RPoAG (β )
is a quasi-convex function of β .
The quasi-convexity of RPoAG implies:
Corollary 2. The points β that minimize RPoAG (β ) on the domain [0,1]n form a convex set. The set of
points β that maximize RPoAG (β ) on the domain [0,1]n includes at least one point that is a 0-1 vector.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
Intuitively, one would expect the worst-case price of anarchy of a game to improve when the altruism level
β gets closer to 1, but we have seen that this is not the case. Indeed, there are important classes of games
for which the robust price of anarchy turns out to be tight, and actually gets worse as the altruism level
of the players increases. The fact that the price of anarchy does not necessarily get worse in all cases is
exemplified by our analysis of symmetric singleton congestion games.
The most immediate future directions include analyzing singleton congestion games with more general
delay functions than linear ones. While the PoA of such functions increases (e.g., the PoA for polynomials
increases exponentially in the degree [4, 14]), this also creates room for potentially larger reductions due to
altruism. Similarly, the characterization of the robust price of anarchy of altruistic congestion games with
more general delay functions (e.g., polynomials) is left for future work.
For games where the smoothness argument cannot give tight bounds, would a refined smoothness argu-
ment like local smoothness in [33] work? For symmetric singleton congestion games, this seems unlikely,
as the PoA bounds are already different between pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
It is also worth trying to apply the smoothness argument or its refinements to analyze the PoA for other
dynamics in other classes of altruistic games, for example, (altruistic) network vaccination games [12],
which are known to not always possess pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, while the existence of pure
Nash equilibria has been shown for singleton and matroid congestion games with player-specific latency
functions [1, 26], the PoA (for pure Nash equilibria or more general equilibrium concepts) has not yet been
addressed. Studying the PoA in such a general setting (in which our setting with altruism can be embedded)
by either smoothness-based techniques or other methods is undoubtedly intriguing.
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A Equilibrium Notions
Some of the natural notions of equilibrium studied in the literature include coarse correlated equilibria (as
defined in Section 2.1), correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, and pure Nash equilibria.
Informally, the difference between a coarse equilibrium and a correlated equilibrium is the following:
In a coarse equilibrium, it is required that a player “adheres” to s when he is informed of the distribution
σ from which s is drawn. In a correlated equilibrium, a player is only required to adhere to s when he is
informed of the distribution σ as well as the strategy that has been drawn for him, i.e., that he will play
under s. More formally, this means that in a correlated equilibrium, for all s∗i ∈ Σi,
Es∼σ [Ci(s)] ≤ Es∼σ [Ci(s∗i ,s−i)] . (7)
(By (s∗i ,s−i), we mean the strategy profile obtained from s when we replace si with s∗i .)
A mixed Nash equilibrium is a coarse equilibrium whose distribution σ is the product of independent
distributions σ1, . . . ,σn for the players. Thus, any mixed Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium.
A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that for each player i, Ci(s)≤Ci(s∗i ,s−i) for all s∗i ∈Σi. A
pure Nash equilibrium is a special case of a mixed Nash equilibrium where the support of σi has cardinality
1 for all i.
B Missing Proofs of Section 2
Proposition 1. Let Gβ be a β -altruistic game. If Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth with µ < 1, then the coarse price
of anarchy of Gβ is at most λ1−µ .
Proof. Let σ be a coarse equilibrium of Gβ , s a random variable with distribution σ , and s∗ ∈ Σ an arbitrary
strategy profile. The coarse equilibrium condition implies that for every player i ∈ N:
E [(1−βi)Ci(s)+βiC(s)]≤ E [(1−βi)Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βiC(s∗i ,s−i)] .
By linearity of expectation, for every player i ∈ N:
E [Ci(s)]≤ E[Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C(s∗i ,s−i)−Ci(s∗i ,s−i))−βi(C(s)−Ci(s))].
By summing over all players and using linearity of expectation, we obtain
E [C(s)]≤ E
[
n
∑
i=1
Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+βi(C−i(s
∗
i ,s−i)−C−i(s))
]
.
Now we use the smoothness property (1) to conclude
E [C(s)]≤ E [λC(s∗)+µC(s)] = λC(s∗)+µE [C(s)] .
Hence, the coarse price of anarchy is at most λ1−µ .
Proposition 2. Let s∗ be a strategy profile minimizing the social cost function C of a β -altruistic game Gβ ,
and s1, . . . ,sT a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player i ∈ N experiences vanishing average
external regret, i.e.,
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
t)≤
(
min
s′i∈Σi
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
′
i,s
t
−i)
)
+o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T strategy profiles then satisfies 1T ∑
T
t=1 C(s
t) ≤ RPoA(β ) ·C(s∗) as
T → ∞.
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Proof. Consider a sequence s1, . . . ,sT of strategy profiles of a β -altruistic game Gβ that is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth
with µ < 1. For every i ∈ N and t ∈ {1, . . . ,T}, define
δ βi (s
t) =Cβi (s
t)−Cβi (s∗i ,st−i).
Let ∆(st) = ∑ni=1 δ
β
i (s
t). We have
∆(st) =
n
∑
i=1
Cβi (s
t)−Cβi (s∗i ,st−i)
=
n
∑
i=1
(
(1−βi)Ci(st)+βiC(st)−
(
(1−βi)Ci(s∗i ,st−i)+βiC(s∗i ,st−i)
))
= C(st)−
n
∑
i=1
(
Ci(s∗i ,s
t
−i)+βi(C−i(s
∗
i ,s
t
−i)−C−i(st))
)
.
Exploiting the (λ ,µ,β )-smoothness property, we obtain
C(st) ≤ λ1−µC(s∗)+ 11−µ∆(st). (8)
Suppose that s1, . . . ,sT is a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player experiences vanishing aver-
age external regret, i.e.,
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
t)≤
(
min
s′i∈Σi
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
′
i,s
t
−i)
)
+o(T ).
We obtain that for every player i ∈ N:
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δi(t)≤ 1T
(
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
t)−min
s′i∈Σi
T
∑
t=1
Cβi (s
′
i,s
t
−i)
)
= o(1).
By summing over all players, we obtain that the average cost of the sequence of T strategy profiles is
1
T
T
∑
t=1
C(st)≤ λ
1−µC(s
∗)+
1
1−µ
n
∑
i=1
(
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δi(t)
)
T→∞−→ λ
1−µC(s
∗).
C Missing Proofs of Section 3
C.1 Reducing to Identity Cost Functions
We show that for general linear congestion games, we can assume without loss of generality that all delay
functions are de(x) = x. We may assume that for every delay function de, the ae and be coefficients are
integers. If this is not the case, then we can multiply all coefficients among all facilities by their least
common multiple in order to obtain a game in which the coefficients are integers. In this new game, the
price of anarchy is the same, as is the set of all equilibria.
Next, we can assume that be = 0 for all e ∈ E. For we can simply replace any facility e ∈ E with
delay function d(x) = aex+be by n+1 facilities facilities e0, . . . ,en with delay functions de0(x) = aex and
dei(x) = bex for 1≤ i≤ n. We then adapt the strategy space Σi of each player i as follows: we replace every
strategy si ∈ Σi in which e occurs by the strategy si \{e}∪{e0,ei}. There is an obvious bijection between
the joint strategies in the original game and those in the new game, preserving the values of individual cost
functions and the social objective function. (Notice that this construction exploits the fact that players are
unit size, and would not carry over to weighted congestion games.)
Finally, for the same reason we can also assume that ae = 1 for all e ∈ E. We replace e with facilities
e1, . . . ,eae , each having delay function dei(x) = x, and adapt the strategy space Σi of each player i by
replacing each strategy si in which e occurs by si\{e}∪{e1, . . . ,aae}. Now, all delay functions are de(x)= x.
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C.2 Proofs of Lemmas
We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma 5. For all x,y ∈ N0, β ∈ [0,1] and α ∈ [0,1], it holds that
((1+β )x+1)y+αβ (1− x)x≤ (2+β − γ)y2+ γx2
for all γ ∈ [ 13 (1+β −2αβ ),1+β ].
Proof. The inequality is equivalent to
((1+β )x+1)y+αβ (1− x)x− (2+β )y2 ≤ γ(x2− y2).
Assume that x= y. The inequality is then trivially satisfied because x≤ x2 for all x ∈N0. Next suppose that
x > y. Then
γ ≥ ((1+β )x+1)y+αβ (1− x)x− (2+β )y
2
x2− y2 .
We show that the maximum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by x = 2 and y = 1. First,
we fill in these values and conclude that for these values, γ ≥ 13 (1+ β − 2αβ ) ≥ 0. We now write x as
y+a,a≥ 1, and rewrite the right-hand side as
f (y,a) =
(1+β )y+αβ
2y+a
+
(1+αβ )(y− y2)
a(2y+a)
−αβ . (9)
Because we know that there are choices of x and a for which f (y,a) is positive (e.g., when y= 1 and a= 1),
and because a only occurs in the denominators, we know that (9) reaches its maximum when a = 1. So we
assume a = 1. When we then fill in y = 0, we see that f (0,1) = 0, so f (1,1)≥ f (0,1). When y > 1 we can
write y as w+2, where w≥ 0, and we can now further rewrite f (y,a) as
f (w+2,1) =
2β −6αβ
2w+5
− (2−β +5αβ )w+(1+αβ )w
2
2w+5
≤ 2β −6αβ
2w+5
.
When 2β −6αβ is negative, this term is certainly less than f (1,1). When 2β −6αβ is positive, we have
f (w+2,1)≤ 2β −6αβ
2w+5
≤ 2β −6αβ
5
≤ 1
3
(2β −6αβ )≤ 1
3
(1+β −2αβ ) = f (1,1).
This shows that γ ≥ f (1,1) = 13 (1+β −2αβ ).
The final case is when x < y. Then,
γ ≤ (2+β )y
2− ((1+β )x+1)y−αβ (1− x)x
y2− x2 .
We show that the minimum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by x = 0 and y = 1. First,
we fill in these values and conclude that for these values, γ ≤ 1+β . We now write y as x+ a, a ≥ 1, and
rewrite the right-hand side as
g(x,a) =
(1+αβ )x2− (1+a+(a+α)β )x−a
a(2x+a)
+2+β .
Suppose first that x = 0 and that a ≥ 2. Then we can write a as 1+ b, b > 0, and therefore f (0,1+ b) =
2+β − 11+b ≥ 32 +β ≥ 1+β = f (0,1). When x≥ 1, we can write x as 1+b, b≥ 0. We then have
f (1+b,a) = 2+β − 2+β +(1−β )b
2b+2+a
+
(1+αβ )(b2+b)
a(2b+2+a)
.
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The last of these terms is positive, hence
f (1+b,a) ≥ 2+β − 2+β +(1−β )b
2b+2+a
≥ 2+β − 2+1+b
2b+2+a
≥ 2+β −1 = 1+β = f (0,1).
This shows that γ ≤ f (0,1) = 1+β .
We use the above lemma to complete the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For every two integers x,y ∈ N0 and βˆ , βˇ ∈ [0,1] with βˆ ≥ βˇ
((1+ βˆ )x+1)y+ βˇ (1− x)x≤ 5+2βˆ+2βˇ3 y2+ 1+βˆ−2βˇ3 x2.
Proof. Choose α ∈ [0,1] such that βˇ = αβˆ . Using Lemma 5 above, we obtain
((1+ βˆ )x+1)y+ βˇ (1− x)x = ((1+ βˆ )x+1)y+αβˆ (1− x)x≤ (2+ βˆ − γ)y2+ γx2,
where γ ∈ [ 13 (1+ βˆ −2αβˆ ),1+ βˆ ]. By choosing γ = 13 (1+ βˆ −2αβˆ ), we obtain
((1+ βˆ )x+1)y+ βˇ (1− x)x≤ 5+2βˆ +2αβˆ
3
y2+
1+ βˆ −2αβˆ
3
x2.
Substituting αβˆ = βˇ yields the claim.
We remark that the choice of γ in the proof above has been made in order to minimize the expression
λ/(1−µ) (which is an increasing function in γ).
Proposition 3. The pure price of stability of uniformly β -altruistic linear congestion games is at most 21+β .
Proof. Let Gβ be a uniformly β -altruistic extension of a linear congestion game. It is not hard to verify
that Gβ is an exact potential game with potential function Φβ (s) = (1− β )Φ(s)+βC(s), where Φ(s) =
∑e∈E ∑
xe(s)
i=1 i is Rosenthal’s potential function. We have
1
2 (1+β )C(s) ≤ Φβ (s) ≤C(s). Let s be a strategy
profile that minimizes Φβ , and let s∗ be an optimal strategy profile that minimizes the social cost function
C. Note that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gβ . We have
C(s)≤ 2
1+β
Φβ (s)≤ 2
1+β
Φβ (s∗)≤ 2
1+β
C(s∗),
which proves the claim.
D Missing Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 2. Assume that the delay functions (de)e∈E are semi-convex. Then there is an optimal strategy
profile s∗ such that xe ≤ x∗e for every edge e ∈ E1.
Proof. Let s∗ be an optimal strategy profile, and assume that x∗e < xe for some e ∈ E1. Then there is some
edge e¯ ∈ E with x∗¯e > xe¯. Consider an altruistic player i ∈ N1 with si = {e}. (Note that i must exist by the
definition of E1.) Because s is a pure Nash equilibrium, player i has no incentive to deviate from e to e¯, i.e.,
C({e¯},s−i)≥C(s), or, equivalently,
(xe¯+1)de¯(xe¯+1)− xe¯de¯(xe¯)≥ xede(xe)− (xe−1)de(xe−1). (10)
Since x∗e < xe and xe¯ < x∗¯e , the semi-convexity of the delay functions implies
(x∗e +1)de(x
∗
e +1)− x∗ede(x∗e) ≤ xede(xe)− (xe−1)de(xe−1), (11)
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(xe¯+1)de¯(xe¯+1)− xe¯de¯(xe¯) ≤ x∗e¯de¯(x∗e¯)− (x∗e¯−1)de¯(x∗e¯−1). (12)
By combining (10), (11) and (12) and re-arranging terms, we obtain
(x∗e +1)de(x
∗
e +1)+(x
∗
e¯−1)de¯(x∗e¯−1)≤ x∗ede(x∗e)+ x∗e¯de¯(x∗e¯).
The above inequality implies that by moving a player j with s∗j = {e¯} from e¯ to e, we obtain a new strategy
profile s′ = ({e},s∗− j) of cost C(s′) ≤C(s∗). (Note that j must exist because x∗¯e > xe¯ ≥ 0.) Moreover, the
number of players on e under the new strategy profile s′ increased by one. We can therefore repeat the above
argument (with s′ in place of s∗) until we obtain an optimal strategy profile that satisfies the claim.
Lemma 4. We have γ ≤ 2n0n+n0 .
Proof. The claim follows directly from Theorem 2 if N1 = /0. Assume that N1 6= /0, and let j ∈ N1 with
s j = {e¯}. Let C¯(s) = ∑i∈N0 Ci(s)/k0 be the average cost experienced by players in N0. We first show
C j(s) ≥ 12C¯(s). If N0 = /0, then C j(s) ≥ 12C¯(s) trivially holds. Suppose that N0 6= /0, and let i ∈ N0 with
si = {e}. Recall that i is selfish. Because s is a Nash equilibrium, we have Ci(s) = aexe+be ≤ ae¯(xe¯+1)+
be¯ ≤ 2(ae¯xe¯ + be¯) = 2C j(s). By summing over all k0 selfish players in N0, we obtain C j(s) ≥ 12C¯(s) and
thus ∑ j∈N1 C j(s)≥ 12 k1C¯(S). We have
γ ≤ k0C¯(S)
k0C¯(S)+ 12 k1C¯(S)
=
2k0
n+ k0
≤ 2n0
n+n0
,
where the last inequality follows because k0 ≤ n0.
E Missing Proofs of Section 5
Proposition 4. The pure price of stability of uniformly β -altruistic cost-sharing games is at most (1−
β )Hn+β .
Proof. Let Gβ be a uniformly β -altruistic cost-sharing game. Gβ is an exact potential game with potential
function Φβ (s) = (1−β )Φ(s)+βC(s), where Φ(s) = ∑e∈E ∑xe(s)i=1 ce/i. It is not hard to verify that C(s)≤
Φβ (s) ≤ (1− β )HnC(s)+ βC(s). The claim now follows by using similar arguments as in the proof of
Proposition 3.
F Missing Proofs of Section 7
Proposition 5. Suppose that G is a class of cost-minimization games equipped with sum-bounded social
cost functions. The set SG = {(λ ,µ,β ) : ∀G ∈ G , Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth} is convex.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary game G ∈ G . It suffices to show that SG = {(λ ,µ,β ) : Gβ is (λ ,µ,β )-smooth} is
convex, because the intersection of any collection of convex sets is always convex.
Let (λ1,µ1,β 1),(λ2,µ2,β 2) ∈ SG be two elements in SG, and pick an arbitrary γ ∈ [0,1]. For all pairs
(s,s∗) of strategy profiles of G,
γ
n
∑
i=1
(Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+β
1
i (C−i(s
∗
i ,s−i)−C−i(s)))
+ (1− γ)
n
∑
i=1
(Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+β
2
i (C−i(s
∗
i ,s−i)−C−i(s)))
≤ γ(λ1C(s∗)+µ1C(s))+(1− γ)(λ2C(s∗)+µ2C(s)).
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By rewriting both sides of the above inequality, we obtain
n
∑
i=1
(Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+(γβ
1
i +(1− γ)β 2i )(C−i(s∗i ,s−i)−C−i(s)))
≤ (γλ1+(1− γ)λ2)C(s∗)+(γµ1+(1− γ)µ2)C(s).
We conclude that G is (γ(λ1,µ1,β 1)+(1− γ)(λ2,µ2,β 2))-smooth. Therefore, SG is convex.
Theorem 6. Let G be a class of games equipped with sum-bounded social cost functions. Then RPoAG (β )
is a quasi-convex function of β .
Proof. Let G ∈ G . We show that for any β 1,β 2 ∈ Rn and γ ∈ [0,1],
RPoA(γβ 1+(1− γ)β 2)≤max{RPoA(β 1),RPoA(β 2)}.
Let (ε1,ε2, . . .) be a decreasing sequence of positive real numbers that tends to 0. Moreover, let
((λ1,1,µ1,1,β 1),(λ1,2,µ1,2,β 1), . . .) and ((λ2,1,µ2,1,β 2),(λ2,2,µ2,2,β 2), . . .)
be sequences of elements in SG (where SG is as defined in the proof of Proposition 5) such that
RPoA(β 1)+ ε j =
λ1, j
1−µ1, j ∀ j and RPoA(β 2)+ ε j =
λ2, j
1−µ2, j ∀ j.
By Proposition 5, we know that for all j,
n
∑
i=1
(Ci(s∗i ,s−i)+(γβ
1
i +(1− γ)β 2i )(C−i(s∗i ,s−i)−C−i(s)))
≤ γ(λ1, jC(s∗)+µ1, jC(s))+(1− γ)(λ2, jC(s∗)+µ2, jC(s))
≤ max{λ1, jC(s∗)+µ1, jC(s),λ2, jC(s∗)+µ2, jC(s)}.
Hence,
RPoA(γβ 1+(1− γ)β 2) ≤ max
{
λ1, j
1−µ1, j ,
λ2, j
1−µ2, j
}
≤ max{RPoA(β 1),RPoA(β 2)}+ ε j,
for all j. By taking the limit of j going to infinity, we conclude RPoA ≤ max{RPoA(β 1),RPoA(β 2)},
which proves the claim.
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